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Abstract 
This paper examines opinions by Supreme Court justices of the most significant death penalty cases 
of the 1970s and 1980s [i.e., Furman v. Georgia (1972), Gregg v. Georgia (1976), Woodson v. North 
Carolina (1976), and McCleskey v. Kemp (1987)].  We seek to determine: 1) what main justifications 
were used by justices to support their own opinions; 2) how inconsistent over these cases were 
justices in issuing their opinions; and 3) what factors led to changes in opinions across time.  We 
examine three types of inconsistency: First, issuing an opinion that is contradictory to opinions 
issued in earlier cases (e.g., a justice rules in favor of capital punishment in one case and then against 
it in another, or vice versa); Second, issuing an opinion that appears to be contradictory to statements 
made in written opinions in earlier cases (e.g., a justice votes in a way opposite to the principles he or 
she has put forth in previous cases); and Third, ruling in a way that appears to violate a precedent or 
rule of law.  We seek to explain such inconsistencies to illuminate why capital punishment is still 
legal despite numerous problems with its application.  It is these cases that best illustrate why capital 
punishment persists. 
1 
Logical and Consistent? 
An Analysis of Supreme Court Opinions Regarding the Death Penalty 
Introduction 
According to Merriam Webster=s Unabridged Dictionary (2002), the term inconsistent means
“lacking consistency; as not compatible with another fact or claim; containing incompatible 
elements; incoherent or illogical in thought or actions.”  The term inconsistent can be applied to 
Supreme Court activity.  For example, insider accounts of Court operations (e.g., see Lazarus, 1999; 
Woodward and Armstrong, 1979) and analyses of private papers of Supreme Court justices (e.g., see 
Epstein and Knight, 1998) show wide inconsistencies across all stages of Court activity.  
Inconsistencies appear in Court decisions to grant or deny certiorari (cert.) in conference discussions 
among justices, in circulated drafts of preliminary opinions, in the final written opinions of the 
justices, and in opinions across time. 
Inconsistency also shows up when considering stays of executions.  One example is that of 
Alpha Otis O=Daniel Stephens, a poor, African American death row inmate in Georgia who was
granted a stay by five justices on the Court (including Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and 
Stevens) in 1986.  When Stephens filed his petition, the same five justices originally agreed to accept 
the case.  Yet, at conference, only three justices voted to hear the case because White and Blackmun 
changed their minds without explanation.  As a result of a dissent prepared by Justice Brennan, the 
New York Times ran an editorial that was highly critical of the Court and its inconsistency.  The 
Court even split 4-4 on whether to grant stays of executions when Justice Powell was away because 
he was ill with cancer.  The New York Times again wrote a scathing editorial of the Court as it 
allowed an inmate to be executed on a tie vote (Lazarus, 1999: 155-157). 
2 
One might wonder how Supreme Court activity could be “lacking [in] consistency; as not 
compatible with another fact or claim; containing incompatible elements; incoherent or illogical in 
thought or actions” especially when lives hang in the balance as they do with the death penalty cases. 
 Apparently, even among Supreme Court justices, capital punishment is a contentious issue.  It seems 
to breed inconsistency.  Lazarus (1999: 13) explains that 
the issue of the death penalty provides an especially revealing view into the Court=s work as
a whole.  Death penalty cases, both now and in the past, cut to the root of the Court=s
ideological divisions.  In the terrible context of a choice between life and death, these cases 
raise many of the issues that have divided the legal world since the Civil War, including 
issues about the Court=s own role and authority.
This paper is aimed at providing some understanding of Supreme Court activity on four 
major cases pertaining to the death penalty in the United States.  Specifically, we examine: 1) what 
main justifications were used by justices to support their own opinions; 2) how inconsistent over 
these cases were individual justices in issuing his/her opinions; and 3) what factors led to changes in 
opinions across time.  Our analysis is limited to the cases that had the largest influence on the 
administration of capital punishment in the United States, including Furman v. Georgia (1972), 
Gregg v. Georgia (1976), Woodson v. North Carolina (1976), and McCleskey v. Kemp (1987).  The 
paper begins with a brief justification for the selection of these particular cases. 
Justification for Selection of the Cases 
Of the many important cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court with regard to capital 
punishment, four cases stand out as the most important because they determined how capital 
punishment is actually carried out in America (Furman v. Georgia, Gregg v. Georgia, Woodson v. 
North Carolina, and McCleskey v. Kemp).  The Court invalidated all capital punishment statutes in 
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effect in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 228 (1972), but failed to abolish it once and for all.  By 
outlining the problems with the way that American jurisdictions practiced the death penalty, the 
Court set the stage for changes to state laws that would be accepted by the Court in Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and others that would be rejected by the Court in Woodson v. North 
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
These three cases are included primarily because as a group they determined first, whether 
capital punishment itself was constitutional, and second, under which conditions for first-degree 
murderers would or would not the death penalty be tolerated.  Finally, the case of McCleskey v. 
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) is included because many capital punishment experts view this case as 
the last real challenge to America=s death penalty experience (Bohm, 2003).  There are dozens of 
cases that could have been selected for analysis, including some before and after the time period 
under study here.  Future analyses might well examine such cases along the lines of this analysis. 
We discuss some of these other cases in this article, but we do not examine any additional 
cases in great detail or attempt to draw conclusions about the universe of death penalty cases for one 
main reason: a careful analysis of the issues addressed in these cases allows one to understand why 
capital punishment is currently legal in the United States despite the numerous and glaring problems 
in its application.  Our belief is that although these cases have been addressed at length elsewhere, 
never before has any other author addressed the very important issue of consistency / inconsistency 
across time in these important death penalty cases.  An analysis of these inconsistencies, we contend, 
is critical to understanding why the death penalty is still legal in the United States.  In fact, our 
experience teaching death penalty courses has shown us that it is these four cases that help our 
students best understand why the Supreme Court has not invalidated death penalty statutes in spite of 
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the clear problems that plague the practice of capital punishment in America (Bohm, 2003).   
Between 1972 and 1987, a total of 12 justices were involved in deciding the constitutionality 
of capital punishment in the United States.  These justices not only decided that the death penalty is 
not unconstitutional per se, thereby assuring its continued practice, but also determined under which 
conditions it could or could not be used.  The next section of the paper provides a brief summary of 
each case and then examines the main justifications for each justice in his/her opinion. 
The Cases and the Main Justifications of Justices in Each Case 
Table 1 lists the justices involved in the cases analyzed in this article.  The main justifications 
for each opinion are listed in the table.  Below, we summarize the opinions of each justice in these 
four cases. 
TABLE 1 about here 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 228 (1972) 
William Henry Furman was convicted of the murder of a Coast Guard petty officer B the 
father of 4 children and the stepfather of 6 others.  Furman was a 25 year old African American with 
an IQ of only 65 who killed his victim in a failed burglary attempt (Bohm, 2003).  This case was 
unusual because it did not fit the stereotypical killing in America.  Because Furman was an African 
American and a stranger, and his victim was a Caucasian and a family man who served in the 
military, Furman=s chance of not receiving the death penalty was slim, especially in a southern state 
with a history of racial unrest. 
Furman=s attorneys argued to the Supreme Court that capital punishment in Georgia was 
unfair because capital trials essentially gave the jury unbridled discretion about whether to impose a 
death sentence on convicted defendants.  Consolidated with Furman were two cases (Jackson v. 
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Georgia, No. 69-5030 and Branch v. Texas, No. 69-5031) that dealt with death sentences imposed 
against African American men for rapes of Caucasian women, a crime which has been a primary 
source of discriminatory punishment in American history. 
The Furman case led to nine separate opinions by each of the justices of the Supreme Court, 
the longest ever opinion and the ruling was 5-4 that the death penalty statutes in question were Acruel 
and unusual@ because they violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 
 Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, and Marshall wrote concurring opinions and Justices 
Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist filed dissenting opinions.  In essence, the Supreme Court 
found that capital punishment was being imposed “arbitrarily, infrequently, and often selectively 
against minorities” (Bohm, 1999: 23).  So, it was not the method of death that was at issue, it was 
how the method was being applied arbitrarily and disproportionately to some groups of people. 
Bohm writes: “A practical effect of Furman was the Supreme Court=s voiding of 40 death 
penalty statutes and the sentences of 629 death row inmates.”  The Supreme Court, however, did not 
conclude that the death penalty, per se, was unconstitutional.  It was only unconstitutional to the 
degree that it was imposed arbitrarily and unfairly.  Thus, “36 states proceeded to adopt new death 
penalty statutes designed to meet the Court=s objections” (p. 24).  States grappled to quickly pass 
death penalty laws that would be considered constitutional by the Supreme Court. 
Nearly one-third of states enacted mandatory death sentences for some crimes (Acker and 
Lanier, 1998), taking the issue of discretion of judges and juries out of the picture.  Most states 
passed Aguided discretion@ statutes that would give juries and sentencing judges some guidelines to 
follow when considering death sentences.  The validity of mandatory sentencing and guided 
sentencing approaches would be decided by the Court only 4 years later with the cases of Woodson v. 
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North Carolina (1976) and Gregg v. Georgia (1976), respectively. 
Justice Douglas defined punishment as cruel and unusual when it is discriminatory or 
selective in its application.  He said that even though unfettered discretion was originally viewed as 
acceptable by the Supreme Court, even as recently as one year prior in McGautha v. California, 402 
U.S. 183 (1971), that once a punishment is arbitrarily applied, it can be considered cruel and unusual. 
 The death penalty as applied without juror guidance is arbitrary, which Douglas suggested was a 
violation of equal protection (see Table 1).  Douglas wrote that providing no guidelines for a juror to 
decide who lives and who dies is unacceptable, especially given that it will assure biases against the 
lower class, those with inferior attorneys, and so forth.  Douglas suggested that the “discriminatory 
statutes are unconstitutional in their operation.  They are pregnant with discrimination and 
discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is 
implicit in the ban on ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments” (pp. 257-258). 
Justice Brennan suggested that although what is cruel and unusual is not clearly defined, to 
him it is something that does not comport with human dignity (see Table 1).  Brennan developed four 
tests to assess whether a punishment comports with human dignity.  First, any punishment that 
degrades human beings is offensive.  Brennan wrote that the reason we outlawed brutal forms of 
punishment is that they violate human dignity because they treat humans as nonhumans.  Second, he 
suggested that any arbitrary punishment, especially a severe one, is unusual: “When a country of over 
200 million people inflicts an unusually severe punishment no more than 50 times a year, the 
inference is strong that the punishment is not being regularly and fairly applied ... the conclusion is 
virtually inescapable that it is being inflicted arbitrarily.  Indeed, it smacks of little more than a 
lottery system” (p. 292).  Third, any punishment that is not acceptable to the public is cruel and 
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unusual.  Finally, a punishment is unnecessary if it is excessive.  Brennan suggested that the death 
penalty is no more effective a deterrent than other punishments such as life imprisonment and thus it 
is unusual.  Because the death penalty meets all these conditions, it is violation of human dignity 
according to Brennan. 
Justice Stewart also grappled with the issue of what is cruel and unusual punishment.  He 
suggested that capital punishment is excessive because it goes beyond what states deem to be 
necessary and because it is arbitrarily applied (see Table 1).  He wrote: “These death sentences are 
cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual ... [they are] so 
wantonly and so freakishly applied” (p. 310). 
Justice White noted at the outset to his opinion that the death penalty is not unconstitutional 
per se and suggests that it is possible for a system of capital punishment to comport with the Eighth 
Amendment.  He wrote that even though death is in theory a valid form of retribution and 
incapacitation, it does not serve either of these goals when it is used so infrequently.  His main 
problem with the death penalty, it appears, is arbitrariness (see Table 1).  White wrote “that the death 
penalty is exacted with great infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes and that there is no 
meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in 
which it is not” (p. 313). 
Marshall, the final justice in the majority, examined the issue of what is cruel and unusual 
punishment and related it to the evolving standards of decency in a maturing society.  He suggested 
that a punishment can be cruel and unusual if it meets any of four conditions (see Table 1).  First, a 
punishment is cruel and unusual if it causes too much physical pain or is excessive.  Second, it is 
cruel and unusual if it has not been practiced prior.  Third, it is cruel and unusual if it serves no valid 
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purpose or it is unnecessary.  Finally, it is cruel and unusual if popular sentiment is against it or it is 
immoral.  Marshall attempted to shoot down all justifications for capital punishment by suggesting 
that the death penalty as practiced does not actually serve retribution, deterrence, or incapacitation.  
He also added that it is more expensive than life imprisonment. 
The most significant part of the Marshall opinion is the statement of what has now been 
called the Marshall hypothesis.  He stated Athe question with which we must deal is not whether a 
substantial proportion of American citizens would today, if polled, opine that capital punishment is 
barbarously cruel, but whether they would find it so in the light of all information presently 
available@ (p. 361).  Marshall put forth what he views as the reality of capital punishment and 
suggests that people would not support it if they knew this reality.  He concluded by writing: 
I believe the following facts would serve to convince even the most hesitant of citizens to 
condemn death as a sanction: capital punishment is imposed discriminatorily against certain 
identifiable classes of people; there is evidence that innocent people have been executed 
before their innocence can be proved; and the death penalty wreaks havoc with out entire 
criminal justice system (pp. 263-264). 
 
In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger suggested that what is cruel and unusual is not clearly 
defined, but noted that what is unacceptable is not up to the Court but is up to legislatures of the 
states and to the U.S. Congress (see Table 1).  He went on to show that the death penalty is widely 
supported in public opinion polls and that it is practiced in 42 jurisdictions, meaning it is not against 
our evolving standards of decency.  Burger conceded that the death penalty is rarely applied but 
wrote that it would “be unrealistic to assume that juries have been perfectly consistent in choosing 
the cases where the death penalty is to be imposed, for no human institution performs with perfect 
consistency” (p. 389).  He appears to be saying that even though the death penalty is arbitrarily 
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applied, this is acceptable since consistency is not humanly possible.  Burger concluded the “claim of 
arbitrariness is not only lacking in empirical support, but also it manifestly fails to establish that the 
death penalty is a ‘cruel and unusual’ punishment” (pp. 398-399).  Furthermore, Burger stated that it 
is not up to courts to decide the efficacy of punishment and that the U.S. Constitution does not 
demand that we follow informed principles of penology.  He suggested that deterrence is simply not 
relevant to the Constitution.   
He stated that the facts of majority are not supported and claims that the Court has exceeded 
its power in its ruling.  Finally, it should be pointed out that Burger noted that decisions by a jury of 
our peers is crucial to our democracy and has been viewed by the Court as an advance from 
mandatory punishments, so to take away discretion of jurors in capital cases is a setback.  Mandatory 
sentencing, according to Burger, gives too much power to the legislature to determine who lives and 
who dies. 
Justice Blackmun began his dissent by noting that he is opposed to death penalty personally 
but that what is right or wrong is not a Court issue (see Table 1).  He wrote: “I yield to no one in the 
depth of my distaste, antipathy, and, indeed, abhorrence, for the death penalty, with all its aspects of 
physical distress and fear and of moral judgment exercised by finite minds.  That distaste is 
buttressed by a belief that capital punishment serves no useful purpose that can be demonstrated” (p. 
405). 
Despite these feelings, Blackmun conclusively demonstrated that society has not evolved, 
especially in the short time since previous cases have been decided by the Court.  Blackmun 
suggested that the argument that society has evolved is “a good argument and it makes sense only in 
a legislative and executive way and not as a judicial expedient” (p. 410).  It is not a Court issue, then, 
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but is an issue for the people to decide through its representatives.  He concluded that the Court has 
simply exceeded its power. 
Justice Powell wrote that the decision departs from the principles of stare decisis, federalism, 
judicial restraint, and separation of powers (see Table 1).  He noted that the Constitution specifically 
says capital punishment is acceptable, that the Supreme Court repeatedly has said capital punishment 
is acceptable, and that legislative activity in the states refutes the evolution argument.  Powell also 
set the stage for future challenges based on race by writing: “If a Negro defendant ... could 
demonstrate that members of his race were being singled out for more severe punishment than others 
charged with the same offense, a constitutional violation might be established” (p. 449).  Finally, 
Powell predicted that only a constitutional amendment will change this ruling and says that the 
decision is undemocratic. 
Finally, Justice Rehnquist succinctly argued that the majority=s lack of judicial restraint in 
striking down the state statutes violates the checks and balances of the U.S. Constitution (see Table 
1).  Rehnquist offered little in the way of explanation for his dissenting opinion. 
As explained earlier, after the Furman decision was handed down, states changed their laws 
in one of two ways.  Some states passed mandatory death sentencing laws and some established 
guided discretion for jurors using bifurcated trials and a system of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances to help determine which convicted murderers should be sentenced to death and which 
should not.  The validity of these laws was decided in Woodson v. North Carolina 428 U.S. 280 
(1976) and Gregg v. Georgia 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) 
Four men were convicted of first-degree murder of a cashier as the result of their participation 
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in an armed robbery of a convenience food store.  James Tyrone Woodson, one of the participants in 
the crime, remained in the car with a rifle as a lookout during the robbery.  He did not enter the store 
nor did he fire any shots.  Further, Woodson claimed that he was coerced into participating in the 
robbery by Luby Waxton, the man who actually fired the fatal shot.  Woodson, who had been 
drinking heavily on the day of the robbery, said that Waxton struck him in the face and threatened to 
kill him in an effort to make him sober up and come along on the robbery. 
The two other robbery participants agreed to plead guilty to lesser charges and to testify for 
the prosecution and thus did not face the death penalty.  During the trial, Waxton asked to be allowed 
to plead guilty to the same lesser offenses to which the others pleaded guilty, but he was not allowed 
to.  Woodson maintained throughout the trial that he had been coerced by Waxton, that he was 
therefore innocent, and that he would not plead guilty. After his trial, Woodson was found guilty on 
all charges and sentenced to death under North Carolina=s mandatory death penalty law. 
Woodson=s attorneys argued to the Supreme Court that mandatory death sentences upon 
conviction for murder are unconstitutional.  The ruling was 5-4 that the death penalty statutes in 
question were “cruel and unusual” because they violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the U.S. Constitution.  Justices Stewart, Powell, Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall were in the majority 
and Justices White, Burger, Rehnquist and Blackmun filed dissenting opinions.  In essence, the 
Supreme Court found that mandatory death sentences violated the evolving standards of respect for 
human life implicit in the Eight Amendment to the Constitution. 
Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, in a plurality opinion by Stewart, held that “two 
crucial indicators of evolving standards of decency respecting the imposition of punishment in our 
society - jury determinations and legislative enactments - conclusively point to the repudiation of 
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automatic death sentences” (p. 280).  That is, society has evolved away from mandatory sentences. 
As shown in Table 1, the majority suggested that mandatory sentences do not take away 
arbitrariness because they do not give juries any guidance about which murderers should live and 
which should die (which offenders should be convicted of capital crimes and which should be 
convicted of lesser sentences).  They also suggested that the respect for human dignity implicit in the 
Eighth Amendment requires 
consideration of aspects of the character of the individual offender and the circumstances of 
the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of imposing the 
ultimate punishment of death [and that the statute in question] impermissibly treats all 
persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings, but as 
members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the 
death penalty (p. 281). 
 
Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens found that juries often “find the death penalty 
inappropriate in a significant number of first-degree murder cases and refuse[] to return guilty 
verdicts for that crime” (p. 291).  They wrote: 
The history of mandatory death penalty statutes in the United States thus reveals that the 
practice of sentencing to death all persons convicted of a particular offense has been rejected 
as unduly harsh and unworkably rigid ... At least since the Revolution, American jurors have, 
with some regularity, disregarded their oaths and refused to convict defendants where a death 
sentence was the automatic consequence of a guilty verdict (p. 293). 
 
Furthermore, using only the actual decisions of death-qualified jurors, where most convicted 
murderers do not actually get sentenced to death, “suggest that under contemporary standards of 
decency death is viewed as an inappropriate punishment for a substantial portion of convicted 
first-degree murderers” (pp. 295-296). 
With regard to the issue of whether there is an evolution in societal standards against capital 
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punishment, these justices concluded that mandatory sentencing laws Areflect attempts by the States 
to retain the death penalty in a form consistent with the Constitution, rather than a renewed societal 
acceptance of mandatory death sentencing@ (p. 298).  They went so far as to claim that these 
mandatory sentencing laws Ahave simply papered over the problem of unguided and unchecked jury 
discretion@ (p. 302).   
Justice Marshall concurred in the judgment for the reasons stated in his dissent in Gregg, 
discussed later in the paper.  Justice Brennan also concurred in the judgment for his reasons stated in 
his dissent in Gregg. 
Justices White, Burger, Rehnquist, and Blackmun dissented in this case for reasons stated in 
other cases (see Table 1).  Rehnquist=s dissent is the longest and is the only one that offers any 
details as to the rationale for the dissent.  Rehnquist suggested that the plurality of Stewart, Powell, 
and Stevens is simply mistaken in their assertion that society has evolved away from mandatory 
sentences for first-degree murderers.  Rehnquist attacks the plurality by writing that the states’ 
willingness to enact statutes providing that penalty is utterly inconsistent with the notion that 
they regarded mandatory capital sentencing as beyond “evolving standards of decency.”  The 
plurality's glib rejection of these legislative decisions as having little weight on the scale 
which it finds in the Eighth Amendment seems to me more an instance of its desire to save 
the people from themselves than a conscientious effort to ascertain the content of any 
“evolving standard of decency” (p. 313). 
 
Rehnquist also reaffirmed his belief that appellate review of sentences will remove any arbitrariness 
in jury decisions, and again asserted that the plurality is ignoring previous decisions such as 
McGautha which approved of unbridled jury discretion in 1971. 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) 
Tony Gregg was convicted of armed robbery and murder after killing two men who had 
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picked up Gregg and fellow hitchhiker Floyd Allen.  Gregg and Allen had been picked up in Florida 
and rode north toward Atlanta when the car broke down.  Simmons was in possession of enough 
cash to purchase a new car.  After purchasing this new car, the group picked up another hitchhiker 
who was let out in Atlanta.  Apparently, Gregg and Allen decided to rob and kill the men after the 
other hitchhiker got out of the car.  This hitchhiker, Dennis Weaver, contacted the police after 
reading about the murders in the newspaper.  The next day, Gregg and Allen were arrested in North 
Carolina driving the victim=s car and were in possession of the murder weapon. 
Gregg=s attorneys argued to the Supreme Court that the new guided discretion law was still 
unconstitutional and asked the Court to overturn the death sentence. The ruling was handed down on 
the same day as Woodson, and was 7-2 that the death penalty statute in question was not 
unconstitutional because it provided guidance to jurors in deciding the fate of convicted murderers.  
Justices Stewart, Powell, Stevens, Burger, Rehnquist, White, and Blackmun were in the majority and 
Justices Brennan and Marshall filed dissenting opinions.  In essence, the Supreme Court found that 
the death penalty per se was not unconstitutional and the application of death penalty under guided 
discretion laws was constitutional.  In upholding the revised statute, the Court gave approval to the 
use of bifurcated trials where guilt or innocence would be decided in the first phase and sentencing 
would be decided in the second, as well as automatic appellate review of convictions and sentences, 
and finally, proportionality reviews to compare sentences of particular cases against similar cases to 
assure just sentencing practices.  Thus, suggestions made by the American Law Institute=s Model 
Penal Code (in 1959), aimed at making the death penalty fairer, and were finally put into place. 
The Court actually decided five cases this day, Gregg (concerning Georgia=s guided 
discretion law and use of bifurcated trials), Woodson (discussed above), Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 
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U.S. 325 (1976) (concerning the state=s mandatory death penalty law that also allowed for lesser 
sentences when defendants were convicted of lesser crimes), Jurek v. Texas, 428, U.S., 262 (1976) 
(concerning the state=s mandatory death penalty law which allowed jury consideration of future 
dangerousness of offenders), and Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (concerning the state=s 
guided discretion law and use of bifurcated trials).  Gregg is discussed here because the Court issued 
the most specific opinion for this case. 
Justices Stewart and White turned out to be the key votes in the Gregg decision, as each had 
voted to void capital punishment as practiced under Furman only four years earlier.  Each of these 
justices changed his mind in this short period of time, concluding that Georgia=s new sentencing 
laws would eliminate the arbitrary sentencing that gave them cause for concern in Furman. 
  Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens found that juries under the new laws were given 
guidance (see Table 1).  They wrote: 
The concerns ... that the death penalty not be imposed arbitrarily or capriciously can be met 
by a carefully drafted statute the ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate 
information and guidance, concerns best met by a system that provides for a bifurcated 
proceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised of the information relevant to the 
imposition of sentence and provided with standards to guide its use of that information (p. 
155). 
 
Further efforts to eliminate arbitrariness under the new laws include a state Supreme Court mandated 
review of the sentence, as noted by Justices White, Burger, and Rehnquist.  The seven justice 
majority also pointed out that juries are given the option of a lesser sentence and that the death 
sentences under review were found not be influenced by prejudice, suggesting the absence of 
arbitrariness. 
The majority found that capital punishment is valid given that it is a democratically elected 
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punishment, that it has a long accepted use in the history of the United States, that there is no 
evidence of an evolution of standards away from the death penalty in society, and that newly passed 
statutes show it does not upset Americans.  They explain that even though the evidence of deterrence 
is unclear, retribution is a valid measure of outrage over murder and thus capital punishment is 
justifiable.   
In summary, the majority of justices quote Justice White=s dissent in Furman by stating that 
with the new guidance given to jurors: “No longer should there be ‘no meaningful basis for 
distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it 
is not’” (p. 198).  A similar sentence boldly claims: “No longer can a jury wantonly and freakishly 
impose the death sentence; it is always circumscribed by the legislative guidelines” (pp. 206-207). 
Justice White, joined by Justices Burger and Rehnquist, discussed that life imprisonment is a 
possible option for juries, that juries must be unanimous in recommending the death penalty, and that 
the state Supreme Court provides a careful review to assure that arbitrariness does not play a role in 
sentencing (see Table 1).  Further, these justices claimed that any potential bias of prosecutors is not 
relevant for arbitrariness.  They wrote that the 
argument that prosecutors behave in a standardless fashion in deciding which cases to try as 
capital felonies is unsupported by any facts ... [the argument] that since prosecutors have the 
power not to charge capital felonies they will exercise that power in a standardless fashion ... 
is untenable.  Absent facts to the contrary, it cannot be assumed that prosecutors will be 
motivated in their charging decision by factors other than the strength of their case and the 
likelihood that a jury would impose the death penalty if it convicts (p. 225). 
 
Justice Blackmun simply concurred in the judgment. 
Justices Brennan and Marshall each dissented from the majority (see Table 1).  Justice 
Brennan asserted again that standards of decency have changed.  He wrote: 
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This Court inescapably has the duty, as the ultimate arbiter of the meaning of our 
Constitution, to say whether, when individuals condemned to death stand before our Bar, 
“moral concepts” require us to hold that the law has progressed to the point where we should 
declare that the punishment of death, like punishments on the rack, the screw, and the wheel, 
is no longer morally tolerable in our civilized society.  My opinion in [Furman] concluded 
that our civilization and the law had progressed to this point and that therefore the 
punishment of death, for whatever crime and under all circumstances, is Acruel and unusual@ 
in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.  I shall not again 
canvass the reasons that led to that conclusion.  I emphasize only that foremost among the 
Amoral concepts@ recognized in our cases and inherent in the Clause is the primary moral 
principle that the State, even as it punishes, must treat its citizens in a manner consistent with 
their intrinsic worth as human beings - a punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading 
to human dignity.  A judicial determination whether the punishment of death comports with 
human dignity is therefore not only permitted but compelled by the Clause (p. 229). 
 
In essence, Brennan concluded that it is a Court duty to regulate morality. 
Justice Marshall claimed that new statutes are not informed by public opinion that is aware of 
the facts of capital punishment, and he even provided evidence from a study in support of his 
Marshall hypothesis from Furman.  Marshall boldly claimed that the Court is wrong in concluding 
that death penalty is not excessive, that the Court accepts a flawed study by Professor Isaac Ehrlich 
which claims a deterrent effect of the death penalty.  He went on to refute the notion that the death 
penalty stops families of murder victims from taking the law into their own hands: “It simply defies 
belief to suggest that the death penalty is necessary to prevent the American people from taking the 
law into their own hands” (p. 238).  Marshall asserted that the death penalty is not necessary to stop 
killing and thus is excessive. 
After the Gregg decision, capital punishment states passed new laws similar to Georgia=s 
and began sentencing more people to death.  In Georgia, the last serious challenge to the death 




McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) 
Warren McCleskey joined three accomplices to rob a furniture store.  McCleskey, an African 
American man, secured the front of the store by rounding up customers and the manager, while his 
accomplices entered the store from the rear.  A silent alarm was tripped and a white police officer 
entered the front of the store.  The officer was hit with two shots, killing him.  McCleskey, while 
under arrest for an unrelated offense, admitted to the robbery but denied the shooting.  Two 
witnesses testified at trial that McCleskey admitted to the shooting and evidence suggested that at 
least one of the bullets came from the type of gun that McCleskey carried during the robbery.  Thus, 
two aggravating factors were determined beyond a reasonable doubt, that McCleskey committed a 
murder during the commission of an armed robbery and that he killed a peace officer engaged in the 
performance of his duties.  No mitigating factors were offered for evidence so the sentencing jury 
recommended death and McCleskey was sentenced to die by the judge. 
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McCleskey=s attorneys argued to the Supreme Court that the administration of capital 
punishment in Georgia was racially biased against African Americans.  The Court heard testimony 
from Professor David Baldus and others who showed in a statistical study that the death penalty was 
applied disproportionately to African Americans in Georgia.  The study utilized a multiple regression 
analysis including 230 variables likely to affect the outcome of death penalty cases in order to test 
the hypothesis that race of defendant and race of victim played a role in death penalty sentences.  
This study found that 11% of people charged with killing whites received the death penalty, but only 
1% of those charged with killing African Americans received the death penalty.  Furthermore, the 
death penalty was assessed in 22% of the cases involving African American defendants and white 
victims, versus only 3% of cases involving white defendants and African American victims.  
Prosecutors sought the death penalty in 70% of cases involving African American defendants and 
white victims, versus only 9% of cases involving white defendants and African American 
defendants. 
After controlling for legally relevant variables, the Baldus study found that defendants 
charged with killing whites were 4.3 times more likely to receive a death sentence than defendants 
charged with killing blacks, or a disparity based on the race of the victim.  The Court recognized the 
validity of these findings and even acknowledged a general pattern of discrimination in the 
application of death sentences in Georgia.  Yet, the Court held that an individual defendant must 
demonstrate discrimination in his or her specific case in order for the case to be considered 
unconstitutional.  That is, he or she must be able to demonstrate that the prosecutor acted in a 




The ruling was 5-4 that statistical evidence of racial discrimination is not enough to 
demonstrate unconstitutional discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment=s Equal 
Protection Clause or irrational, arbitrary, capricious sentencing under the Eighth Amendment.  For 
capital punishment to be unconstitutional, a person must prove either that he or she was 
discriminated against as an individual and/or that the legislature intended for law to be 
discriminatory.  Justices Powell, Rehnquist, White, O=Connor, and Scalia were in the majority and 
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens filed dissenting opinions.  
The evidence of racial bias presented in the Baldus study, discussed earlier, was dismissed by 
the five justice majority (see Table 1): “The statistics do not prove that race enters into any capital 
sentencing decisions or that race was a factor in petitioner’s case.  The likelihood of racial prejudice 
allegedly shown by the study does not constitute the constitutional measure of an unacceptable risk 
of racial prejudice’ (p. 281); “At most, the Baldus study indicates a discrepancy that appears to 
correlate with race, but this discrepancy does not constitute a major systemic defect” (p. 281). 
Justice Powell, joined by Rehnquist, White, O=Connor, and Scalia, suggested that the burden 
rests on the defendant to show purposeful discrimination by the prosecution. The Court assumed the 
validity of Baldus study but dismissed the findings as inconsequential and suggested that disparities 
“are an inevitable part of our criminal justice system” (p. 312).  It concluded that: “In light of the 
safeguards designed to minimize racial bias in the process, the fundamental value of a jury trial in 
our criminal justice system, and the benefits that discretion provides to criminal defendants, we hold 
that the Baldus study does not demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias affecting 
the Georgia capital sentencing process” (p. 213).  After discussing the numerous efforts to minimize 
bias in the system, and claiming that discrimination is an issue left for the legislature not the courts, 
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the majority compared race to other possible disparities that could be demonstrated such as one 
based on different facial characteristics or attractiveness. 
Justice Brennan, joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, disagreed (see Table 1).  They 
wrote: “Nothing could convey more powerfully the intractable reality of the death penalty: ‘that the 
effort to eliminate arbitrariness in the infliction of that ultimate sanction is so plainly doomed to 
failure that it - and the death penalty - must be abandoned altogether’,” quoting an earlier decision by 
Justice Marshall (p. 320).  The dissent suggested that a demonstrated pattern of disparity based on 
race violates Furman, which said that even a substantial risk of arbitrary punishment is 
unconstitutional, and Gregg, which suggested a pattern of arbitrary sentencing, would be 
unconstitutional.  The dissent discussed the racial make-up of victims and those subjected to capital 
punishment since the Gregg decision and concluded that there is clear evidence of discrimination by 
prosecutors in Georgia.  They concluded that McCleskey=s sentence was likely based on race and 
thus he cannot be put to death. 
The dissent also pointed out numerous times when the Court has previously ruled that 
evidence of race discrimination is not acceptable and that racial discrimination is a problem in other 
areas of the criminal justice system.  They claimed that if juries consider race, their discretion should 
be taken away: AReliance on race in imposing capital punishment, however, is antithetical to the 
very rationale for granting sentencing discretion@ (p. 336).  The dissent concluded by asserting that 
the Court, by finding that disparities are meaningless given all the safeguards, relies on safeguards 
that obviously do not work.  Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Marshall, Stevens, and Brennan 
also asserted that the Court issues an opinion that is inconsistent with previous rulings that have set 
aside convictions when racial discrimination is illustrated and that have required the prosecution to 
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prove that it is not race but some other relevant factor that can explain away the discrimination.  That 
disparities were most prevalent in the mid-range murder cases B where prosecutors and juries 
actually had discretion to decide which cases were or were not capital cases and which convicted 
defendants would live or die B seemed to illustrate clearly that prosecutors and juries were abusing 
their discretion.  This argument, however, did not convince the Court.  
Degree of Inconsistency Across Furman, Woodson, Gregg, and McCleskey 
From the analysis of the opinions in these four cases, it is clear that some justices were 
inconsistent in their opinions.  For the purposes of this article, we seek three forms of inconsistency: 
1) issuing an opinion that is contradictory to opinions issued in earlier cases (e.g., a justice rules in 
favor of capital punishment in one case and then against it in another, or vice versa); issuing an 
opinion that appears to be contradictory to statements made in written opinions in earlier cases (e.g., 
a justice votes in a way opposite to the principles he or she has put forth in previous cases); and 3) 
ruling in a way that appears to violate a precedent or rule of law. 
Table 2 illustrates the degree of inconsistency among justices across the cases of study.  We 
have classified opinions into those that favor abolition of capital punishment as practiced or those 
that favor retention of the death penalty.  These terms are misleading because the rulings in these 
cases only apply to the cases themselves and the laws to which they relate, not to the issue of capital 
punishment itself.  Thus, we have labeled in Table 2 decisions as either Afavoring abolition in the 
case@ or Afavoring retention in the case.@  As you can see, some justices did change their minds 
about the administration of capital punishment over time, depending on the specific issue being 
decided (a change in position is indicated with the * symbol).  The most important of these were 
justices White and Stewart, who opposed capital punishment in Furman, but who gained confidence 
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in capital punishment after states passed laws to remove arbitrariness in death penalty sentencing (by 
passing mandatory sentencing laws, giving jurors guidance in death penalty sentencing, using 
bifurcated trials, and providing post-conviction review).  White voted to reinstate capital punishment 
in Woodson and Gregg while Stewart only voted to reinstate capital punishment in Gregg. 
TABLE 2 about here 
Table 3 shows under which conditions each justice involved in these four cases determined 
that capital punishment is acceptable.  The number in the last column of the table reflects the number 
of cases, out of the four cases analyzed here, that each justice ruled in favor of retaining capital 
punishment. 
TABLE 3 about here 
This review of all opinions of the justices in these cases seems to support the following 
findings: 
1) Rehnquist and Burger are the Court=s strongest proponents of capital punishment in these 
cases; 
2) Brennan and Marshall are the Court=s strongest opponents of capital punishment in these 
cases; 
3) Only four justices who ruled in at least three of the cases issued opinions on the same side of 
the issue every time, either for retention of capital punishment or for its abolition (Rehnquist 
and Burger for retention, Brennan and Marshall for abolition); and 
4) There is evidence of what can be called inconsistency in the opinions of individual justices in 
these cases that can only be detected with careful review of opinions across time. 
 
As noted earlier, specific examples of inconsistencies in opinions of justices could take three 
forms.  First, there are those opinions that are contradictory to opinions issued in earlier cases (we 
will call this TYPE I inconsistency).  Second, there are those opinions that appear to be contradictory 
to statements made in written opinions in earlier cases (we will call this TYPE II inconsistency).  
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Third, the Court rules in way that appears to violate a precedent or rule of law (we will refer to this 
as TYPE III inconsistency).  Here are some examples of each type of inconsistency: 
1) The decision in Furman violated the precedent set only one year earlier in McGautha which 
approved of unbridled jury discretion (TYPE III inconsistency); 
 
2) White and Stewart opposed capital punishment in Furman in part because of the theoretical 
possibility of arbitrary sentencing but gained enough confidence in capital punishment to 
vote to reinstate capital punishment in Gregg after states passed laws to remove arbitrariness 
in death penalty sentencing (given the lack of evidence of a lack of arbitrariness, this change 
in opinion is a TYPE I inconsistency); 
 
3) Stewart left the Court prior to McCleskey but White voted in McCleskey to retain capital 
punishment even after evidence showed a pattern of disparity based on race of victim, which 
is suggestive of arbitrary sentencing (Since White=s opinion in McCleskey contradicts his 
concerns expressed in Furman and Gregg, this is a TYPE II inconsistency); 
 
4) Justices Stevens and Blackmun, who both voted to reinstate capital punishment in Gregg, 
each voted to end capital punishment in McCleskey based on the evidence of racial disparity. 
 Blackmun had voted in each of the previous three cases to retain or reinstate capital 
punishment, and Stevens voted to reinstate capital punishment in Gregg (TYPE I 
inconsistency).  It could be argued that social scientific evidence of disparities in the 
sentences convinced two justices to change their minds, but this evidence was seen as 
insufficient to provide proof of individual discrimination by the other justices; 
 
5) Blackmun accepted the Baldus study in McCleskey despite having rejected statistical 
evidence of racial discrimination in rape cases in Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970) 
(TYPE II inconsistency); 
 
6) Powell ruled to retain or reinstate capital punishment in all cases except for mandatory 
sentencing (TYPE I inconsistency).  To Powell, juror discretion is fundamental to the 
American justice system, so removing it through mandatory sentencing is not acceptable 
even if it removes disparities.  At the same time, disparities emerging from juror discretion 
are apparently acceptable because he voted to retain capital punishment in McCleskey; 
 
7) Powell in Furman claimed that a pattern of race discrimination could lead to a valid Eighth 
Amendment challenge, but he ruled against the validity of this very challenge in McCleskey 
(TYPE II inconsistency); 
8) Burger in Furman noted how jury discretion was superior to mandatory sentencing but then 
voted to uphold mandatory sentencing in Woodson (TYPE II inconsistency); 
 
9) The standard from McCleskey, which places the burden on individual defendants to prove 
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purposeful discrimination, is a different standard than in other situations such as the use of 
peremptory challenges to exclude minorities from juries (TYPE III inconsistency).  For 
example, under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), prosecutors are required to prove 
that race did not play a role in dismissal of potential jurors if the defendant alleges that race 
played a role in decisions for peremptory challenges.  Peremptory challenges and the death 
penalty are two separate issues, but it is hard to justify different standards to prove racial 
discrimination; 
 
10) Strangely, Justice Powell authored the Court=s opinion for the seven justice majority in 
Batson.  Had he stayed consistent in his reasoning, Powell would have seen the legitimacy of 
McCleskey=s claims; yet, Powell voted against McCleskey with the five justice majority 
(TYPE II inconsistency). 
 
11) Similarly, Justice White had written in his Gregg opinion that: AAbsent facts to the contrary, 
it cannot be assumed that prosecutors will be motivated in their charging decision by factors 
other than the strength of their case and the likelihood that a jury would impose the death 
penalty if it convicts@ (p. 225).  When the facts were presented to the Court in McCleskey 
that suggested race of victim played a role in capital sentencing, it did not change his mind as 
to the guided discretion statutes (TYPE II inconsistency). Lazarus (1999: 199) points out that 
White was Apersistently skeptical of claimants seeking to prove discrimination by showing 
unequal racial outcomes as opposed to more direct proof of intentional discrimination.@  
White reasoned that the findings of the Baldus study might be explained by some other 
factor, even though Baldus controlled for more than 230 other variables including all legally 
relevant ones; and 
 
12) The ruling in McCleskey, which suggested that racial disparities could possibly be explained 
away by other factors, also was inconsistent with the ruling in Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 
79 (1986) where Athe Court had specifically stated that a statistical study need not take into 
account every conceivable variable to qualify as meaningful evidence of discrimination@ 
(Lazarus, 1999: 208) (The different standard for proving discrimination is again a form of 
TYPE III inconsistency). 
 
These examples show that justices do change their minds over time and do not remain 
consistent in their interpretations even when confronted with seemingly identical issues.  Although 
each case reviewed here is a unique case with facts specific to each case, ideally the Supreme Court 
will not ignore its own precedents, nor should individual justices ignore their previous opinions or 
the reasoning used to arrive at previous decisions. 
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Factors That May Lead to Changes in Opinions Across Time: Explaining Type I, II, and III 
Inconsistencies
One might wonder how the Court and its justices could be so inconsistent over time with 
respect to capital punishment or any given issue.  It seems to the layperson that once a punishment is 
declared unconstitutional or constitutional, the issue is decided.  In fact: Aevery issue is always open 
for reargument in later cases; changed parties, changed circumstances, and changed courts often lead 
to changed conclusions@ (Lieberman, 1992: 21).  This is apt description for the Supreme Court 
decisions in the death penalty cases examined here. 
According to the literature, potential explanations for inconsistencies in Court activity 
include: 1) the ambiguous nature of the Constitution; 2) ideology/attitudes and political party 
affiliation of individual justices; 3) approach to interpreting the Constitution; 4) strategic rationality 
and bargaining, 5) changing justices over time; 6) evolving human standards; and 7) public opinion 
and state legislative activity (e.g., see Epstein and Knight, 1998; Segal and Spaeth, 1993).  Each of 
these explanations is briefly addressed below. 
Ambiguous Nature of the Constitution 
Part of the inconsistency problem seems to stem from the very nature of the Constitution 
itself.  Lieberman (1992: 12) describes it as Aelusive, ambiguous, murky, sometimes quite opaque 
...@ such that its meaning could be known Aonly through some human, and fallible, means of 
interpretation.@  As explained by Epstein and Walker (1998), justices can make decisions by: 
interpreting the Constitution literally; attempting to interpret the meaning of individual words in the 
Constitution; making logical inferences; and enforcing stare decisis.  In the case of capital 
punishment, a literal interpretation of the Constitution would suggest that it is acceptable: AIn both 
Due Process Clauses, the Constitution itself recognizes the death penalty, in saying that a person may 
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be deprived of life as long as in so doing the government acts with due process of law@ (Lieberman, 
1992: 149).  Justices in the cases analyzed here did generally acknowledge that capital punishment is 
permissible according to the Constitution. 
When the justices used the approach of determining the meaning of key words (such as 
Acruel@ and Aunusual@), they disagreed about the meaning of these words and this affected their 
decisions.  For example, in Furman, Justice Douglas said capital punishment would be cruel and 
unusual if it was discriminatory or selective in its application.  Justice Brennan suggested that 
although what is cruel and unusual is not clearly defined, to him it is something that does not 
comport with human dignity, either because it degrades human beings, it is arbitrary, it is acceptable 
to the public, or it is unnecessary.  To Justice Stewart, a punishment is cruel and unusual if it is 
excessive and/or arbitrary.  To Justice White, a cruel and unusual punishment is arbitrarily applied.  
To Justice Marshall, a cruel and unusual punishment is one that violates the evolving standards of 
decency in a maturing society, either because it causes too much physical pain or is excessive, it has 
not been practiced prior, it serves no valid purpose or it is unnecessary, or if popular sentiment is 
against it or it is immoral. 
Finally, justices in these cases also attempted to make logical inferences based on their 
reasoning abilities and referred to previous decisions of the Court to justify their opinions, but 
different justices reached different conclusions.  For example, some justices inferred discrimination 
from clear disparities in McCleskey as they thought previous Court decisions called for.  Others 
justices either refused to make such inferences or disagreed that such inferences were appropriate, 
despite the fact that such inferences had been encouraged in previous cases. 
The ambiguous nature of the Constitution might account for TYPE I inconsistencies (issuing 
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an opinion that is contradictory to opinions issued in earlier cases) or TYPE II inconsistencies 
(issuing an opinion that appears to be contradictory to statements made in written opinions in earlier 
cases).  Justices may very well interpret the Constitution differently at different stages of their 
careers, based on their variable understanding of the Constitution, even when dealing with the same 
basic issues such as those that are common in death penalty cases.  However, we believe the 
ambiguous nature of the Constitution would appear to best account for TYPE III inconsistencies 
(ruling in a way that violates a precedent or rule of law), for as the Court is more conservative or 
more liberal, the approach to interpreting the Constitution would be significantly different.  Thus, 
precedents might be more likely to be overturned when they were established by Courts with 
different political persuasions.   
Ideology / Attitudes and Political Party Affiliation of Justices 
The importance of ideology or personal attitudes of justices cannot be understated (Epstein 
and Knight, 1998; Segal, 1984; Segal and Cover, 1989; Segal and Spaeth, 1993; Tate, 1981).  As 
shown in Table 1 of this analysis, justices in these cases simply disagreed about the proper role of the 
Courts in dealing with issues such as arbitrary sentencing and demonstrated disparities in 
punishment.  Opposing ideologies led to opposing opinions even when justices agreed about the 
relevant facts in the cases reviewed. 
Ideology logically affects one=s political party affiliation and one=s approach to interpreting 
the Constitution, so it is difficult to separate out the effects of these influences.  It is clear in these 
cases that these factors played a role.  Political party affiliation appears to have played a role in the 
opinions of justices in these four cases.  In these cases, 12 justices wrote 36 opinions, 20 to retain 
capital punishment and 16 to halt its use.  Justices identified as Democrats issued 10 opinions to halt 
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capital punishment and only three to retain it; all three to retain it were by the same justice (White).  
Justices identified as Republicans issued 17 opinions to retain capital punishment and only six to halt 
it (five of these by Stevens and Stewart).  Two of the four cases most clearly provide evidence of a 
relationship between political party affiliation and the opinion issued in the case: in Furman, four out 
of five Republican justices voted to retain capital punishment, all four of which were nominated by 
President Nixon; and in Gregg, all six Republican justices voted to reinstate capital punishment. 
Justice Burger was chosen by Nixon because Burger opposed many of the advances made in 
the areas of individual rights and liberties during the Warren Court years.  Justice Blackmun, a 
boyhood friend of Burger, was chosen to achieve Nixon=s promise of turning the Court around 
(Lazarus, 1999; Wagman, 1993).  Interestingly, Wagman (1993) noted many inconsistencies in 
Burger=s record: 
But quite possibly no Chief Justice has come to the Court with a background so filled with 
contradictions.  As a young lawyer in Minneapolis, Burger was known as a defender of 
individual rights, and at one time served as co-chairman of the Minnesota Commission on 
Human Rights.  In his thirteen years on the court of appeals, he had developed a reputation as 
an expert in the area of court administration, and had exhibited a moderately conservative 
voting record.  But he was also a sharp critic of the activism of the Warren Court.  During his 
Senate confirmation, Burger put on his most moderate face and was easily confirmed.  But it 
was clear he was Nixon=s choice because the president believed Burger would move the 
Court back to the right (p. 114). 
 
He did so in the death penalty cases reviewed here, voting all three times in the decisions he was 
involved with to retain or reinstate the death penalty. 
We cannot make firm conclusions about the role of political party affiliation in death penalty 
cases for we have only examined four cases here.  But, in these cases, there is evidence of an 
association between political party affiliation of the justices and the opinions issued.  We suspect that 
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political party affiliation best accounts for TYPE III inconsistencies because conservative Courts 
tend to be more likely to overturn precedents established by liberal Courts, and vice versa (Epstein et 
al., 1996). 
Approach to Interpreting the Constitution 
Why would political party affect the decisions of the justices in these cases?  Here is where 
basic beliefs about the proper role of the Supreme Court in American government come into play 
(George and Epstein, 1992; Segal and Cover, 1989; Tate, 1981). 
Disagreements among justices about capital punishment often come down to disparate views 
of the proper role of the government in settling disputes among people and their government, and the 
appropriate role of the courts in resolving constitutional issues.  The most important of these issues 
include federalism, the separation of powers, and individual rights and liberties versus government 
power (Epstein and Walker, 1998: 7; Lieberman, 1992: 7). 
Federalism refers to the distribution of power between the United States federal government 
and its states.  Certain powers are granted to the federal government by the Constitution, whereas 
others are reserved for the states, and some are denied to both the federal government and to the 
states (Peltason, 1997).  The separation of powers refers to the endowment of different powers to 
different branches of American government (legislative, judicial, and executive branches), as well as 
constraints on those powers that can be exercised by other branches of government through a system 
of checks and balances (Epstein and Walker, 1998; Lieberman, 1992; Walker and Epstein, 1993).  
Certain individual rights and liberties are guaranteed by the Constitution.  Because of the Bill of 
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, neither the federal government nor the 
states are permitted to violate these rights and liberties without serious consequences (Robinson, 
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2002).  The issues of federalism, the separation of powers, and individual rights and liberties versus 
government power affected rulings of justices in major cases dealing with capital punishment. 
Republicans tend to favor less involvement of the federal government in state issues 
(federalism).  In the cases reviewed here, Republican justices were more likely to temper their 
opinions by concerns of separation of power issues and judicial restraint.  Democrat justices in the 
cases reviewed here were more inclined to extend the power of the Court and to engage in so-called 
Ajudicial activism.@  Interestingly, justices on both sides cited case law to support their opinions 
while freely ignoring or violating precedents that could have or should have changed their own 
opinions (TYPE III inconsistency); thus stare decisis appears to be a matter of choice over which 
precedents should take precedence.  This may be why Epstein and Walker (1998: 30) claimed: 
AMany allege that judicial appeal to precedent often is mere window dressing, used to hide 
ideologies and values, rather than a substantive form of analysis.@ 
Data from Epstein et al. (1996) show that of the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts 
through 1995, the Rehnquist Court was the least Aliberal@ Court in the areas of civil liberties and 
federalism.  In civil liberties, nearly 79% of the Warren Court decisions were liberal, versus 
approximately 30% for the Burger Court and only about 21% for the Rehnquist Court.  In federalism 
cases, more than 73% of the Warren Court decisions were liberal, versus nearly 68% of Burger Court 
decisions but just over 39% of Rehnquist decisions.  This means the Rehnquist Court was the least 
likely to decide cases in favor of individual defendants and most likely to decide cases in favor of 
state governments, respectively.  Instead, decisions of the Rehnquist Court tend to uphold the rights 
of states above all else.  In fact, Woodward and Armstrong (1979: 181) asserted that to Rehnquist 
the human error of wrongfully depriving a man of his constitutional rights was less severe 
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than mistakenly striking down an otherwise constitutional statute.  For the Court to thwart 
the will of the legislature was, in Rehnquist=s view, to violate the rights of every individual 
in that state.  That was a far greater wrong than allowing one man to die. 
 
This is why Rehnquist supposedly voted in Furman to uphold the death penalty as practiced (and in 
every case since). 
The Rehnquist Court is associated, at least in part, with the strongly conservative nature of 
the Chief Justice himself.  Rehnquist=s successful efforts to limit federal habeas corpus appeals 
stems from his disgust over what he saw as abuses of such appeals by criminal defendants over his 
life.  On the other side of the Court decisions reviewed here are Brennan and Marshall, who in 
virtually every appeal to the Court, granted cert. to review the case and voted to overturn or stay an 
execution (Lazarus, 1999). 
The data from Epstein et al. also show that Democrat justices were more likely to be activists 
(defined as declaring, with the majority, a law to be unconstitutional).  For Democrat justices, the 
percentages of votes with the majority to declare laws unconstitutional were 97% (Brennan), 94% 
(Marshall), 94% (Douglas), and 78% (White).  For Republican justices, the percentages were 89% 
(Powell), 85% (Stevens), 83% (Stewart), 76% (Blackmun), 73% (O=Connor), 69% (Burger), 69% 
(Scalia), and 39% (Rehnquist).  Epstein and Walker (1998: 36) define activists as justices who 
believe that the proper role of the Court is to assert independent positions in deciding cases, 
to review the actions of the other branches vigorously, to strike down unconstitutional acts 
willingly, and to impose far-reaching remedies for legal wrongs whenever necessary.  
Restraint-oriented justices take the opposite position.  Courts should not become involved in 
the questions of other branches unless absolutely necessary.  The benefit of the doubt should 
be given to actions taken by elected officials.  Courts should impose remedies that are 
narrowly tailored to correct a specific legal wrong. 
 
There is much debate among legal scholars as to whether judicial activism is appropriate 
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(Cox, 1987; Jones, 2001), and this is a highly controversial topic among justices (Bellacosa, 1992).  
This debate is informed by the actions of individual conservative and liberal justices (Gates and 
Phelps, 1991).  In the death penalty cases reviewed here, it appears that Republican nominated 
justices voted to restrain the Court=s power while Democrat justices voted to extend it.  Yet, 
scholars rightly point out that conservative justices are also activists (Shane, 2000; Sunstein, 1999), 
in part by their refusal to accept changing standards of the law.  Epstein and Walker (1998: 37) note: 
"An activist judge need not be liberal, and a judge who practices restraint need not be conservative." 
 For example, the U.S. Supreme Court=s refusal to hear all but a handful of cases as witnessed by the 
Rehnquist Court=s Ashrinking docket@ can be seen both as evidence of restraint (Chemerinsky, 
1996) and as a form of activism because Rehnquist is moving the Court farther to the right of the 
political spectrum.  In fact, the shifting make-up of the Court to the right can be considered a form of 
activism (Howard, 1993). 
In the four death penalty cases reviewed here, it seems as if both sides were less interested in 
making good decisions than in assuring the outcomes they decided.  Lazarus (1999: 420) claimed 
that in many decisions in important cases 
narrow Court majorities transformed constitutional law on the basis of opinions the Justices 
knew to be wholly inadequate and unconvincing [which could explain TYPE I 
inconsistency].  Individual Justices sought to advance their political agendas by employing 
legal arguments in which they themselves did not believe or methods of interpretation they 
had uniformly rejected in the past [which could explain TYPE II inconsistency].  Neither side 
respected precedent, except when convenient; both sides tried to twist the Court=s internal 
rules to attain narrow advantage [which could explain TYPE III inconsistency]. 
 
In other words, politics intervened in a way that affected the decisions of the justices.  We suspect 
that political party affiliation, which for Supreme Court justices roughly equates to their approach to 
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interpreting the Constitution, best explains TYPE III inconsistency.  Again, conservative and liberal 
justices appear to have a different approach to interpreting the Constitution, as witnessed in the 
analysis of the four major death penalty cases here. 
Strategic Rationality and Bargaining 
From the literature, it is also clear that justices bargain with one another before writing their 
final opinions, that they change their minds often as they bargain, and that their changing opinions 
sometimes are merely to please senior members of the Court (Lazarus, 1999).  Stearns (1999) 
showed that justices sometimes change votes on some issue before the Court in order to achieve their 
desired outcome.  It appears that the justices bargain with one another through verbal and written 
exchanges to assure that the outcome of the law will match their own preferred positions rather than 
to be consistent with the principle of stare decisis (Epstein and Knight, 1998: 57).  In fact, 
abandonment of precedent is common in the Supreme Court.  For example, Segal and Spaeth (1993) 
illustrate that the past three Courts (with Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist as Chief Justices) have 
overturned an average of 2.7 precedents per term, with a range of between 2.6 and 2.9 precedents per 
term.  Other studies show how little stare decisis really matters (Segal and Spaeth, 1996).  A study of 
64 death penalty cases between since 1972 found that outcomes could be accurately predicted using 
precedents in 75% of the cases (George and Epstein, 1992).  This means 25% of such cases could not 
be accurately predicted using stare decisis.  Given the conflicting precedents from different Courts 
and the changing justices, this is not surprising. 
Much of the bargaining that goes on behind closed doors at the U.S. Supreme Court occurs 
with freshman justices.  The Afreshman effect@ suggests that veteran justices may try to sway the 
new justice to their side in order to assure a particular outcome (Melone, 1990; Scheb and Ailshie, 
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1985).  This effect cannot be documented absolutely in the cases reviewed here, but it may partially 
account for why Court opinions in death penalty cases are in some ways not consistent.  
In the book, The Brethren (1979), called the first ever inside view of the U.S. Supreme Court, 
Woodward and Armstrong examined the inner workings of the Court between 1969 and 1976.  They 
discussed three of the key cases discussed here, Furman, Woodson, and Gregg.  According to their 
account, Stewart voted in Furman with the majority mainly because of the horror of thinking that his 
one vote could send hundreds of people to their deaths through capital punishment.  If true, 
Stewart=s votes were not based on precedent or law but rather on his own rejection of capital 
punishment. 
According to Woodward and Armstrong, freshman Justice Powell determined to do as much 
research into the death penalty as he possibly could to inform his vote in Furman; he also thought he 
could sway other justices on the Court such as White and Stewart, who in conference discussions 
voted with the majority to outlaw capital punishment as practiced, but who had both voted in 
McGautha to uphold unguided jury discretion in capital cases (TYPE I inconsistency).  According to 
Woodward and Armstrong, APowell discovered an unbroken line of precedents to uphold the death 
penalty@ and thus was determined to make sure it was upheld in line with the principle of stare 
decisis (p. 213).  Of course, Powell was unsuccessful but Powell did learn that White and Stewart 
voted not based on the Constitution but on other grounds (their own philosophies about capital 
punishment).  This led Lazarus (1999) to call the Furman decision a horrible mistake. 
Strangely, Woodward and Armstrong claimed that Powell privately feared that the Furman 
decision would lead to mandatory death sentencing laws B something he did not favor.  As noted 
above, Powell voted in Woodson to abolish North Carolina=s mandatory death sentencing laws.  At 
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the same time, during Furman, White told his clerks he preferred mandatory death laws to unguided 
discretion, at least for heinous murders, and he voted in Woodson to uphold North Carolina=s 
mandatory law. 
Woodward and Armstrong discussed the very strange occurrences in the Court in considering 
Woodson, Gregg, and the other cases announced on the same day.  Chief Justice Burger, even though 
he was not in the majority, assigned the writing of the opinion of the Court to Justice White, 
supposedly to stop his wavering and assure his vote for the justices who wanted to vote to uphold the 
death penalty statutes in question.  Because of their agreement, a Atroika@ of justices emerged, 
consisting of Powell, Stevens, and Stewart.  These justices met and worked out a rationale to strike 
some of the death penalty laws and to uphold others, trying their best to come up with a logical and 
consistent argument across cases.  White, learning of the invincibility of this plurality, sent the cases 
back for reassignment, and the three justices would work out a way to vote together.  These justices 
took the law into their own hands, refused to overrule the ruling in McGautha which held that jury 
guidance and bifurcated trials were not required in death penalty cases, and simply pieced together 
rulings that would overcome Furman but seem to be inconsistent with McGautha.  As described by 
Woodward and Armstrong (1979: 440), these justices Awere acting like a superlegislature,@ 
seemingly violating the separation of powers. 
In another inside look at the Court in the book, Closed Chambers (1999), Lazarus, a former 
clerk for Justice Powell, agreed with the analysis of Woodward and Armstrong.  Lazarus asserted 
that after hearing arguments in Gregg, Powell wrote in his conference notes that AI accept Furman as 
precedent.@  Lazarus thought that Powell would likely vote to reject the new death penalty statutes 
that provided guidance to juries (Lazarus, 1999: 116).  During the hearing of Woodson, Gregg, and 
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the other three cases, Powell approached Stewart and the freshman Justice Stevens to have lunch and 
to formulate a Acentrist >troika=@ for these capital cases, meaning that these three justices controlled 
the Court and the direction of its decisions.  Indeed, these three justices wrote with the majority in 
both Woodson and Gregg: AStewart, Powell, and Stevens set a new death penalty agenda for the 
Court ... the centrists had in effect appointed themselves overseers of the newly approved yet highly 
regulated business of capital punishment@ (Lazarus, 1999: 117). 
Another telling example of bargaining comes from the case of Tompkins v. Texas, 490 U.S. 
754 (1989), disposed of by the Court in 1988 by a 4-4 vote.  According to the account by Lazarus 
(1999), Phillip Tompkins was an African American male with an IQ of around 70 who abducted a 
young, white woman after rear-ending her car while smoking dope.  After abducting her he tied her 
to a tree and gagged her with a bed sheet while he took her ATM card and went to the bank to 
withdraw $1,000 from her account.  Despite the fact that Tompkins confession to the crime clearly 
indicated that he did not intend to kill his victim, he was convicted of felony murder and sentenced to 
death by a Houston jury.  Tompkins appealed to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and ultimately 
the U.S. Supreme Court after being convicted by an all-white jury.  Of the 13 potential African 
American jurors at his trial, eight were struck for cause and five were dismissed by the prosecutor 
using peremptory challenges.  Tompkins alleged a Batson violation, suggesting that the prosecutor 
illegally used race to dismiss potential jurors, and a violation of the Court=s ruling in Beck v. 
Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) because the trial judge did not allow the jury to consider a lesser 
offense of unintentional murder. 
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, rather than following the Batson ruling that said a 
defendant would only have to raise an inference that race was used to exclude potential jurors, 
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conducted its own inquiry into the facts of the dismissals and simply invented possible explanations 
that were race neutral.  After the Tompkins oral arguments, eight of the Supreme Court justices met 
for a conference discussion (O=Connor excused herself because her husband worked for a law firm 
that had once represented Tompkins).  According to Lazarus (1999), the preliminary vote among the 
eight participating justices was 5-2-1 in favor of Tompkins on his Batson claim B Justices Rehnquist 
and White sided with the state of Texas while Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and 
Kennedy sided with Tompkins.  Justice Scalia was undecided. 
Justice Stevens, the senior justice in the majority, drafted an opinion and waited for 
responses, where the bargaining among justices could begin.  Lazarus asserted that Scalia quickly not 
only joined the two justices in the minority but also questioned the very formula for determining 
Batson violations (which was derived from plaintiff friendly employment law that in the view of 
conservatives encouraged frivolous discrimination lawsuits).  After Scalia sent out his memo, Justice 
Kennedy, who was in his first full term on the Court, began to express skepticism about the Batson 
claim.  After sitting on his decision for more than six months, Justice Kennedy formally switched his 
vote.  Lazarus (1999: 67) claimed: AAlthough Kennedy still found the Texas court of appeal=s 
Batson discussion >difficult to accept=, he had done his own review of the Batson ruling and had 
concluded that the Texas district court had it right all along.@  In other words, Kennedy accepted the 
invented justifications for the dismissal of potential African American jurors that were race neutral.  
Kennedy=s revised vote, which ran counter to statements he had made to other justices about the 
absurdity of excuses offered by prosecutors to dismiss potential African American jurors (TYPE II 
inconsistency), assured the final vote would be 4-4 and thus the case would be dismissed by the 
Court.  AHis revised vote guaranteed that the Court would split 4-4 on the Batson issue, strictly along 
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political lines: Rehnquist, White, Scalia, and Kennedy on the one side; Brennan, Marshall, 
Blackmun, and Stevens on the other@ (Lazarus, 1999: 68).  Lazarus concluded that Athe Justices 
lined up exactly as one might have predicted before the case was briefed or argued B liberals on one 
side, conservatives on the other, a gorge between them and no bridge across even in an easy case@ (p. 
72). 
Strategic rationality and bargaining could explain any of the three types of inconsistency we 
have seen in the four major death penalty cases reviewed here.  It could account for why an 
individual justice might issue an opinion that is contradictory to opinions issued in earlier cases 
(TYPE I inconsistency), or an opinion that appears to be contradictory to statements made in written 
opinions in earlier cases (TYPE II inconsistency).  The bargaining that went on in the Gregg case, 
led by Justice Powell, is an example of this.  Strategic rationality and bargaining could logically lead 
to a precedent being overturned by the Court, as well (TYPE III inconsistency).  The significant point 
is that since justices bargain behind closed doors on issues unrelated to the facts of individual cases, 
it should not be surprising that inconsistencies arise in Court decisions.  We=d expect strategic 
rationality and bargaining to best account for Type I and Type II inconsistencies B i.e., to best 
explain inconsistencies over time in various opinions of individual justices rather than in violations 
of precedent by different Courts. 
Change of Justices Over Time 
One obvious explanation of inconsistency in rulings over time is the change in the justices of 
the Court.  One startling example is the case of Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970), heard first 
in 1967.  According to Woodward and Armstrong (1979), the justices voted secretly 6 to 3 to strike 
down the death penalty as practiced in Arkansas (with Justices Warren, Douglas, Harlan, Brennan, 
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Fortas, and Marshall in the majority and Justices Black, Stewart, and White in the minority).  Chief 
Justice Warren, being in the majority, assigned the writing of the majority opinion to Douglas.  After 
reading the Douglas opinion, Harlan changed his vote, making the vote 5-4.  Before the opinion was 
issued by the Court, Justice Fortas resigned, leaving the Court split on the case 4-4.  In 1969, with 
Warren=s vote replaced by Justice Burger, the Court now stood 5-3 to uphold the death penalty law 
in Arkansas.  Harlan insisted that the Court not issue an opinion until the ninth justice was appointed 
to the Court.  When Justice Blackmun arrived and voted in 1970 to uphold the death penalty without 
any jury guidance in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), it was clear that the Court now 
stood at 6 to 3 to uphold the Arkansas law. 
Another example relevant for the cases reviewed here occurred between the ruling of 
McGautha and Furman.  Two justices (Black and Harlan) retired and were replaced by Nixon 
appointees Powell and Rehnquist, both of whom had called for and/or achieved significant cutbacks 
in defendants= rights as attorneys prior to their arrival on the Supreme Court.  McGautha, decided by 
a 5-4 majority, included Stewart and White in the majority.  These two justices switched their 
opinions only one year later in Furman.  Similarly, while Justice Douglas was ill and unavailable to 
hear arguments, cases would often split 4-4 until Douglas finally decided to retire in 1975.  Douglas, 
who had ruled with the majority in Furman was replaced by Stevens in 1976.  Stevens ultimately 
ruled with the majority in Gregg, something Douglas may not have done. 
When Justice Stewart retired in 1981, he was replaced by Reagan nominee O=Connor, who 
voted with the majority in McCleskey saying that disparities in capital sentencing were insufficient to 
make the sanction unconstitutional.  Recall that although Stewart voted with the majority in Gregg, 
he previously voted with the majorities in Furman and Woodson to ban unguided death sentences 
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and mandatory death sentences, respectively.  In both of these opinions, Stewart expressed concern 
over arbitrary sentencing and thus would have likely been very distressed with the evidence 
presented in McCleskey.  It is thus possible that the McCleskey case could have been decided 5-4 to 
the end of capital punishment if Stewart had stayed on the Court.  Additionally Chief Justice Burger 
resigned and Rehnquist was elevated to Chief Justice and replaced by Scalia one month prior to 
McCleskey.  It is possible that this affected the bargaining process and perhaps the opinions of the 
justices. 
A final example shows how shifting justices in the Court affected outcomes.  In a second 
appeal to the Supreme Court by McCleskey, his attorneys discovered that key evidence against him 
had been discovered by a prison informant eliciting incriminating information from him, a violation 
of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).  The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected 
McCleskey=s claim first on the basis that it was filed too late and that the error was harmless, even 
though the evidence was hidden by the state for years; McCleskey appealed to the Supreme Court.  
Four justices (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens) agreed to hear the case.  Upon the 
retirement of Brennan, Justice Souter, a Reagan appointee, joined the five justices who voted against 
granting cert. to deny McCleskey=s Massiah violation claim, meaning McCleskey lost 6-3.  What is 
alleged by some is that the justices nominated by Republicans were motivated to reject McCleskey=s 
Massiah claim, in part, by the fact that this rule was created by the more liberal Warren Court. 
Changing justices on the Court could account for all three types of inconsistency.  Justices 
sometimes change their minds when confronted with strong justices on the other side of an issue.  
This could produce TYPE I or TYPE II inconsistencies over time.  Yet, we believe that changing 
justices on the Court best explains TYPE III inconsistencies, as precedents established by previous 
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justices are more likely to be overturned by Courts with different agendas. 
Evolving Human Standards 
Another source of inconsistency is the evolution of human standards that effect how the 
Constitution is interpreted.  In the words of Lieberman (1992: 11), the Supreme Court has engaged in 
Abending and twisting and refashioning the constitutional clauses to fit its changing circumstances.@ 
 This means that justices can interpret the meaning of constitutional clauses based on present day 
standards.  This was the key to the majority justices in Furman and the dissenting justices in Gregg.  
That the justices are free to determine the meaning of words based on modern standards does not 
mean they can invent meaning or make it up, but these charges have been levied against so-called 
Aactivist@ judges (Cox, 1987; Jones, 2001). 
Under these conditions, it is understandable that a degree of inconsistency will emerge in 
Court activity and opinions of individual justices, even with a single issue such as the death penalty.  
In fact, as more and more opinions are written about any given issue, Athe Court must engage in 
attempts to reconcile the irreconcilable, fitting together a pattern of cases decided at different times 
for different reasons by different justices with different agendas@ (Lieberman, 1992: 19). 
The death penalty is an issue that is very susceptible to changing opinions over time.  
American society appears to be evolving away from the use of capital punishment, although 
remarkable slowly.  At the time of this writing, there is still great debate about capital punishment in 
many state legislatures and Congress.  Public opinion polls (e.g., Gallup) show that support for 
capital punishment is at its lowest since the early 1980s.  According to numerous studies reviewed by 
the Death Penalty Information Center, when given alternatives such as life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole plus restitution to the victim=s family, roughly half of Americans now say they 
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would not vote for capital punishment.  Approximately half of Americans also now report that they 
would support a moratorium on capital punishment, that they believe an innocent person has been 
executed, and that the death penalty is not administered fairly (Death Penalty Information Center, 
2005). 
Related to evolving human standards is the evolution of individual justices over time, which 
could easily account for either Type I or Type II inconsistency.  Justice Blackmun (a supporter of 
capital punishment in three of the four cases reviewed here), in a dissent to deny cert. in Callins v. 
James, 000 U.S. U10343 (1994), second-guessed his previous opinions and wrote: 
From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death.  For more than 
20 years, I have endeavored B indeed, I have struggled B along with a majority of this Court, 
to develop procedural and substantive rules that would lend more than the mere appearance 
of fairness to the death penalty endeavor.  Rather than continue to coddle the Court's delusion 
that the desired level of fairness has been achieved and the need for regulation eviscerated, I 
feel morally and intellectually obligated simply to concede that the death penalty experiment 
has failed.  It is virtually self-evident to me now that no combination of procedural rules or 
substantive regulations ever can save the death penalty from its inherent constitutional 
deficiencies.  The basic question B does the system accurately and consistently determine 
which defendants >deserve= to die? B cannot be answered in the affirmative ... The problem 
is that the inevitability of factual, legal, and moral error gives us a system that we know must 
wrongly kill some defendants, a system that fails to deliver the fair, consistent, and reliable 
sentences of death required by the Constitution. 
 
Stephenson (1994) analyzed the change of heart of Justice Blackmun with regard to capital 
punishment and suggested that Blackmun may have been highly affected by Justices Brennan and 
Marshall over time, and basically worn down by the constant stream of cases which showed clearly 
that the administration of the death penalty was plagued by problems related to ambiguity and 
unfairness. 
We suspect that evolving human standards of society and individual justices would best 
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account for TYPE I and TYPE II inconsistencies.  That is, justices may change their minds about 
previous opinions and the rationale expressed within, as evidence about society=s changing values 
mounts.  Evolving human standards could also account for TYPE III inconsistency if enough justices 
on the Court were convinced that rulings from past Courts are inconsistent with today=s 
understanding of the Constitution. 
Public Opinion and State Legislative Activity 
According to the literature, public opinion and state legislative activity also are likely to 
affect Court activity (Marshall, 1989; Mishler and Sheehan, 1993).  Both of these are seen as 
indicators of evolving social conditions, as noted by justices on both sides of the capital punishment 
cases reviewed here.  It is clear from both of these indicators that a majority of Americans supported 
capital punishment during the 1970s and 1980s.  In fact, after the Furman decision and subsequent 
speeches by President Nixon about the value of the death penalty, public support for capital 
punishment actually grew in public opinion polls.  Justices Marshall and Brennan claimed the 
majority of Americans really did not support capital punishment but only said they did when asked 
general questions. 
According to Bohm (2003), death penalty opinion is important for five reasons.  First, it has 
effects on legislators, meaning as long as they perceive that Americans want capital punishment we 
will have it.  Second, public opinion may influence prosecutors to seek the death penalty in cases 
where demand is high.  Third, public opinion may pressure judges to impose death sentences even 
when the jury recommends life.  Fourth, public opinion may dissuade governors from vetoing 
legislation, issuing stays, and commuting sentences.  Finally, as this analysis shows, public opinion is 
used by the Courts to justify its practice. 
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There are numerous surveys that assess death penalty opinion, and the findings of surveys 
depend on how the questions are asked.  As noted earlier, people generally say they support capital 
punishment, but support declines to less than 50% when people are given other options such as life 
in prison without parole (Death Penalty Information Center, 2005).  Research shows that capital 
punishment is less supported by the highly educated and that support decreases with knowledge 
about the realities of the death penalty, especially problems with it such as racial disparities and 
wrongful convictions in capital cases.  These results are consistent with the hypothesis stated by 
Justice Marshall in Furman and Gregg. 
So, it is possible that Marshall and Brennan were correct when they asserted that a majority 
of Americans really do not support capital punishment, even though the other justices were correct 
when they asserted that public opinion polls at the time of these cases indicated clear support for the 
death penalty.  Since 36 states drafted new legislation after Furman there was a clear message to the 
Court that America=s legislators also perceived support for capital punishment. 
Related to the issue of public opinion and state legislative activity is the Atough on crime@ 
movement that began in the late 1960s and continues today (Robinson, 2005; Shelden, 2001; 
Shelden and Brown, 2003).  Beginning in 1973, America began an incarceration boom that is 
unprecedented in world history.  The tough on crime movement generated and supported by 
Presidents Nixon, Reagan, Bush (the first), Clinton, and Bush (the second) led to many harsh laws, 
including new death penalty legislation at the federal level.  These presidents also nominated justices 
who tended to support capital punishment and principles of law that would interfere with a 
defendant=s ability to raise appeals such as federal habeas corpus appeals.  The Nixon nominees of 
Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Powell would vote together in three of the four cases reviewed here, all to 
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retain capital punishment as practiced.  Reagan appointees O=Connor and Scalia had key votes in 
McCleskey and each voted to deny McCleskey=s second appeal to the Court.  The inference by 
Lazarus (1999) that politics has invaded the Court and its decision-making may thus be true, 
although it is difficult to tell for sure given the secretive nature of Court deliberations. 
Changes in public opinion and state legislative activity could easily lead individual justices to 
change their minds about whether capital punishment is cruel and unusual punishment, for example 
(TYPE I inconsistency) or to back off from a rationale asserting that the public supports or does not 
support capital punishment (TYPE II inconsistency).  It could also lead to a precedent being 
overturned, like we recently saw in the cases of Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), and Roper 
V. Simmons (No. 03-0633).  In these cases, respectively, the Court decided by a 6-3 majority that the 
death penalty can no longer could be used against the mentally retarded and by 5-4 that it is 
unconstitutional to execute juvenile offenders.  Atkins overturned Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 
(1989), which decided by a 5-4 margin that states could execute the mentally retarded.  
Roper overturned Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), which decided by a 5-4 margin than 
the execution of 16- and 17-year-old offenders was constitutionally permissible. 
Why the changes?  Since 1989, at least 18 of the 38 death penalty states passed laws 
forbidding the imposition of the death penalty against mentally retarded people.  Further, by 2005, at 
least 30 states prohibited the juvenile death penalty, including 12 that have rejected the death penalty 
altogether.  These trends affected the decision of the Court in the Atkins case and the Roper case 
because the Court state legislative activity suggested that standards of decency had changed in the 
United States in less than two decades. 
Discussion and a Look to the Future: 
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The Death Penalty and the Supreme Court in the 21st Century 
 
From the analysis of four significant capital punishment cases B Furman v. Georgia, 408 
U.S. 288 (1972), Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 
(1976), and McCleskey v. Kemp, 482 U.S. 279 (1987) B it is clear that some justices= opinions were 
contradictory to opinions issued in earlier cases.  We called this TYPE I inconsistency.  It is also 
clear that some justices’ opinions were contradictory to statements made in written opinions in 
earlier cases.  We called this TYPE II inconsistency.  Finally, we saw that the Court ruled in ways 
that violated precedents or rules of law, which we referred to as TYPE III inconsistency. 
We suggested possible explanations for these inconsistencies, including 1) the ambiguous 
nature of the Constitution; 2) ideology/attitudes and political party affiliation of individual justices; 
3) approach to interpreting the Constitution; 4) strategic rationality and bargaining, 5) changing 
justices over time; 6) evolving human standards; and 7) public opinion and state legislative activity.  
Each of these factors leads to inconsistency in Court activity, and we showed how each factor likely 
influenced the four major death penalty cases reviewed in this article. 
Specifically, we concluded that Type I inconsistency is best explained by strategic rationality 
and bargaining by justices and by evolving standards of decency in society.  Type II inconsistency is 
also best explained by strategic rationality and bargaining by justices and by evolving standards of 
decency in society.  Type III inconsistency is best explained by the ambiguous nature of the 
Constitution, political party affiliation of justices, the approach to interpreting the Constitution of 
justices, and by changing justices on the Court. 
Given the major problems with the administration of capital punishment in the United States 
B including ambiguous sentencing, racial disparities in death sentences based on race of the victims, 
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and wrongful convictions and executions of innocent people (Acker, Bohm, and Lanier, 2003; Bedau 
and Cassell, 2005; Robinson, 2005; Shelden and Brown, 2003; Zimring, 2004) B one might wonder 
why we continue to impose the sentence.  In fact, many of the students in our death penalty classes 
wonder just this.  The analysis of these four cases provides some explanation for why the sanction is 
still legal.  The Court is not charged with reviewing the scientific evidence on a particular sanction 
and then deciding whether or not we should continue to impose it.  Instead, it attempts to interpret 
the law of the Constitution in order to ascertain whether a sanction such as the death penalty as 
practiced is legally permissible under the Constitution.  As we have shown with our review of four of 
the most significant death penalty cases the Court has ever heard, the Court is unable to give clear 
meaning to some sections of the Constitution, and justices disagree about the meaning. 
The Court also rules on issues pertaining to capital punishment that are subject to change 
based on which justices sit on the Court, based on their ideology/attitudes and political party 
affiliation, and based on their approach to interpreting the Constitution.  Evolving human standards, 
strategic rationality and bargaining, and public opinion and state legislative activity also seem to 
make consistency in Court activity impossible.  Even when public opinion seems clear, or state 
legislative activity shows an emerging trend, some justices will disagree about the meaning of the 
data and/or dismiss it as invalid, irrelevant, and so forth. 
It should be pointed out that social scientific evidence may not sway the Court in its rulings 
related to disparities in sentencing, innocence, and similar issues.  The justices already have shown 
both a lack of understanding of and a general disdain for studies such those offered in McCleskey as 
well as a lack of understanding of research methodology and advanced statistics.  According to 
Lazarus (1999), Professor Baldus, whose study was the basis for McCleskey=s first appeal, was 
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dismayed by the Court=s dismissal of the findings of his study.  The Court even refused to appoint 
an independent special master to provide a full understanding of the meaning of the Baldus study. 
In an analysis of 28 capital punishment cases decided in the late 1980s, Acker (1993) 
illustrated that although social science evidence did figure prominently in decisions, justices were 
more interested in discounting the findings from studies than using them to inform their opinions.  
Acker suggested that Court outcomes were decided based on principles that had little or nothing to 
do with the scientific evidence.  Other analyses of Supreme Court decision making with regard to 
scientific evidence on issues such as measuring “evolving standards of decency,” “fitness to be 
executed,” deterrence, and discrimination, show that the Supreme Court is inconsistent in its 
reasoning (Diamond and Casper, 1994; Haney and Logan, 1994). 
In the recent Atkins case, discussed earlier, Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented from the six 
justice majority and wrote nearly two pages questioning the validity of public opinion polls that 
consistently show that Americans generally do not favor executing the mentally retarded.  In addition 
to the Atkins case, the Court also recently decided Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), where it 
ruled 7-2 that it is unconstitutional to have a judge (rather than a jury) decide the critical sentencing 
issues in a death penalty case.  Thus, a jury (rather than a judge) must find aggravating circumstances 
in order to impose the death penalty. 
As for the likely future of capital punishment in the Court, the Death Penalty Information 
Center reports that, as usual, the Supreme Court is hearing and considering the outcome of numerous 
death penalty cases.  The Court may also eventually end up hearing a case related to the issue of 
innocence and the death penalty based on the challenge by U.S. District Court Judge Jed Rakoff, who 
declared the federal death penalty unconstitutional on the ground that innocent people are being 
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sentenced to death.  This claim is now backed up by numerous studies (e.g., see Liebman, Fagan, and 
West, 2000; Liebman et al., 2002) and the fact that over 100 inmates have been released from death 
row in the United States since Gregg.  The innocence issue has led to a strong moratorium 
movement in some American states, one that would likely be acknowledged and considered by the 
Court if it rules on this issue in the near future. 
A few states have instituted moratoria on executions pending study of the process to see if it 
is broken, and if so, to see if it can be fixed.  In Illinois, Governor George Ryan discovered that since 
1977, only 12 death row inmates had been put to death while 13 had been freed from death row.  The 
Report of the Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment was released in April 2002, and 
contains 85 recommendations to make the death penalty process less likely to result in wrongful 
executions. 
One might think that, if the issue of the constitutionality of executions of the innocent ever 
reaches the Supreme Court, the outcome would be the formal abolition of the death penalty.  Perhaps 
the Court would acknowledge that even guided discretion statutes cannot assure that innocent people 
will not fall victim to the death penalty.  Yet, based on the analysis of the four major death penalty 
cases in this article, this outcome is not assured.  Although public opinion may have begun to turn 
against capital punishment, a majority of Americans still report being in favor of the death penalty, 
and it is still legal in 38 jurisdictions in the United States (including 36 states, the federal 
government, and the military).  Two other states have death penalty statutes, but both were deemed 
unconstitutional in 2004 (Kansas and New York). Additionally, like it did with cases reviewed here, 
the Court will likely struggle with the ambiguous nature of the Constitution.  The outcome may be 
determined based on which justices sit on the Court B according to their ideology/attitudes, political 
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party affiliation, and approach to interpreting the Constitution.  Since President Bush will have 
successfully placed at least two nominees on the Court by the time his second term is over, one could 
reasonably predict a more conservative Court with regard to death penalty cases over the next several 
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Table 1: Main Justifications Offered for Decisions of Justices in Major Supreme Court Cases Regarding the Death Penalty  Furman    Woodson   Gregg     McCleskey  Douglas arbitrary sentences   -----------   -----------    ----------- violation of equal protection  Brennan arbitrary sentences   see Gregg   degrading to human beings  arbitrary sentences (racial disparity) degrading to human beings      not acceptable to public  decision abandons stare decisis not acceptable to public        Stewart arbitrary sentences   not acceptable to public arbitrary sentences not possible ----------- excessive    arbitrary sentences possible supported by public    violates human dignity  White  arbitrary sentences   acceptable to public  arbitrary sentences not possible disparity is not discrimination supported by public   intentional discrimination required is not a Court issue  Marshall arbitrary sentences   see Gregg   excessive    arbitrary sentences (racial disparity) excessive        not acceptable to informed public decision abandons stare decisis not acceptable to informed public      wrongful convictions  Burger  is not a Court issue   acceptable to public  arbitrary sentences not possible supported by public       supported by public arbitrary sentences not relevant  Blackmun is not a Court issue   see Furman   offers concurring opinion  arbitrary sentences (racial disparity) decision abandons stare decisis  Rehnquist decision violates separation of acceptable to public  arbitrary sentences not possible disparity is not discrimination powers (checks & balances)      acceptable to public   intentional discrimination required of Constitution            is not a Court issue  Powell  decision abandons stare decisis, not acceptable to public arbitrary sentences not possible disparity is not discrimination federalism, judicial restraint  arbitrary sentences possible acceptable to public   intentional discrimination required violates human dignity      is not a Court issue  Stevens  -----------   not acceptable to public arbitrary sentences not possible arbitrary sentences (racial disparity) arbitrary sentences possible acceptable to public   decision abandons stare decisis violates human dignity O=Connor  -----------   -----------   -----------    disparity is not discrimination intentional discrimination required is not a Court issue  Scalia   -----------   -----------   -----------    disparity is not discrimination intentional discrimination required is not a Court issue 
 
 
Table 2: Consistency of Justices in Major Supreme Court Cases Regarding the Death Penalty 
 
Favoring Abolition in the Case 
 
Furman Woodson  Gregg  McCleskey 
 
Douglas Stevens (new)    *Stevens 
Brennan Brennan   Brennan Brennan 
Stewart Stewart 
Marshall Marshall  Marshall Marshall 
White  *Powell    *Blackmun 
 
Favoring Retention in the Case 
 
Burger  Burger   Burger   
Blackmun Blackmun  Blackmun 
Rehnquist Rehnquist  Rehnquist Rehnquist 
Powell  *White  White  White 
*Stewart O=Connor (new) 
*Powell Powell 
*Stevens Scalia (new) 
 
* indicates a switch of position from the earlier decision  
 
 
Table 3: Specifying When Capital Punishment in Acceptable in Four Major Supreme Court 
Cases (Furman, Woodson, Gregg, McCleskey) 
 
Justice   When is capital punishment acceptable? # Cases Ruled 
Rehnquist  under all conditions    4/4 
Burger   under all conditions    3/3 
*O=Connor  under all conditions    1/1 
*Scalia  under all conditions    1/1 
Blackmun  all except a pattern of racial disparity  3/4 
Powell   all except mandatory death sentences  3/4 
White   all except evidence of arbitrary sentences 3/4 
Stewart  only with juror guidance, bifurcated trials, 
post conviction review   1/3 
Stevens  only with juror guidance, bifurcated trials, 
post conviction review   1/3 
*Douglas  never      0/1 
Brennan  never      0/4 
Marshall  never      0/4 
 
* only involved in one decision in the analysis  
 
